10 Fun Facts About Northeastern

Northeastern University is located in the heart of Boston, MA - one of the most popular college towns in the U.S. Apart from its popular college location and vibrant student life, what do you know about Northeastern? If the answer is nothing, you’ll love these 10 fun facts! 1. Northeastern was originally called the Evening Institute of Young Men, and was founded in association with YMCA in 1898. 2. Originally a cross-country team tradition, the Underwear Run is now a college tradition that takes place every Parent’s Weekend. Coincidence? We think not. 3.Northeastern’s Co-op (Cooperative Education) Program attracts many applicants to apply. Not only is it one of the most popular programs, Northeastern was actually one of the first schools to instill such a program in 1909.4. Home to the Northeastern Huskies, Matthews Arena is the oldest hockey arena in the world. 5. Biz Stone, one of Twitter’s co-founder, attended Northeastern to study Arts but dropped out. 6. Even though the Northeastern Huskies have never won the NCAA tournament, they have produced NBA players like Reggie Lewis and J.J. Barea. 7. Shawn Fanning founded Napster at Northeastern and dropped out in 1999. 8.Northeastern’s Cabot Center is an indoor athletic avenue that was rebuilt on the Huntington Avenue Grounds, which was where the first World Series was held. There is a plaque that marks the spot on where the left field foul line used to be. 9. Wendy Williams attended Northeastern University and graduated with a B.A. in Communications in 1986. 10.The Northeastern’s Snell Library has over 1 millions visitors each year. Are you looking to apply toNortheastern? Make sure to search through profiles of students accepted to see essays, stats, and advice. See how they got in, and how you can too!

Sonic Slippage Project

Sonic Slippage Project Sonic Slippage project of re-making videos and adding new musical and spatial dimensions introduces new trends and perspectives in perception of image and sound. The main idea of reinvented experimental videos is to rely on unconventional combinations of sound, image, colors, and silence.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Sonic Slippage Project specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Various synergies of the enumerated components create distorted perceptions and sights of new media demonstration. Thus, the films under analysis reproduce new aesthetic dimensions and forms to engage into a new understanding of the purpose of filming. The short movie called Lossless #2 by Baron and Goodwin reproduces an interesting mixture of compressed digital image of another movie called Meshes of the Afternoon. While looking at the video, attention should be given to the way the distorted objects are accompanied by unusual sounds, which coul d not even called music. Indeed, the synergy of sounds and digital information provoke unusual and abrupt emotions, which differ from those when you watch a traditional video. New media characteristics of the movie provide a new materialistic dimension by means of digital disruption and removal of certain scenes. Though the plot of the movie is not understandable, it still attracts attention and makes the audience concentrate on making sense of the watched. Distortion of images and unusual submerge of two visual dimensions is represented in the video called Lilith. The film illustrates a complex unity of voice, mobile objects and silence. Special effects are also introduced to endow the picture with a new meaning. In particular, the author depicts a close confrontation between nature and technology, as well as what could happen if both collide. Apart from topic considerations, Lilith also demonstrates new approaches to depicting objects whose flexible nature influences the perceptio n of spatial dimension. Once again, the unusual application of media devices creates a new pattern of transformation experienced through synchronic distortion of video and audio channels. Both – Film #3: Interwoven and Looking for Mushrooms – experiment on combinations between colors, image, and sounds. In particular, Interwoven reproduces simplistic duet of music and colorful figure movements. The emerging figures move to the music and vice versa and, therefore, it is often hard which media device dominates in the movie.Advertising Looking for essay on art and design? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More In contrast, Looking for Mushrooms prioritizes the importance of music patterns and their influence on visual patterns. The point is that video images are almost identical, but they might acquire different meaning while being accompanied by various sounds. At the end of the movie, five musical frames are co mbined to create a continuous projection of both sound and images. While watching the movie Looking for Mushrooms, the sound patterns were especially intense in the middle of the plot. The sound of music pattern enhanced the depressed atmosphere of the images that quickly replace on another. In addition, Looking for Mushroom also rely on the play of colors in combination with music, which also creates a psychedelic atmosphere while watching. In conclusion, the experimental films under consideration do not adhere to traditional presentation of ideas, meanings, and fact. Their primary function is to emphasize how the connection of sound, silence, and distorted image creates a new perceptual dimension. Assemblage of music patterns engaged into speechless objects, as well as distorted images, contributes to creating new aesthetical meaning of media development. The emerged dissonance calls for the rejection of consistency and conventionalism of image and voice.

Mrs. Fields' Cookies Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Mrs. Fields' Cookies - Case Study Example Although in the early years, the concentration was rigid on the product lining of the company to market only the cookies, in the later years, with the improvement in the performance, the company started marketing ice-creams and other baked products along with cookies in 14 unparallel flavors and varieties. Incidentally, the company emerged as one of the major players in the sweet snack industry. The company in this virtue expanded its operations in different parts of Japan, Hong Kong and Australia. It was during 1987 when the company initiated the acquisition of a France based bakery and/or sandwich store named as La Petite Boulangerie (LPB). LPB during the period was operating through almost 119 stores scattered in every nook and corner of the country under the corporate head of PepsiCo (Harvard Business School, â€Å"Mrs. Fields' Cookies†). Fields’ Initial Actions upon Acquiring LPB The dimensions of LPB in terms of both product lining and organizational structure wer e largely different from that of Mrs. Fields’, Inc during the period. Therefore, it was quite likely that in the realistic practices both the companies will have unparallel values and objectives as well. In this regard, to transform the objectives and the vision of LPB in order to be similar as that of Mrs. Fields’, certain major changes were enforced which brought about drastic changes in the managerial outlook of the company. For instance, LPB associated more than 53 administrative staffs to control its outlets through various departments from marketing and sales to Research & Development (R&D). But as a result of the acquisition, the number of administrative staffs was reduced to only three as Mrs. Fields’ took control of the overhead functions of LPB, such as the finance department, the human resources department and others. Only the operations and the R&D department were left unchanged (Harvard Business School, â€Å"Mrs. Fields' Cookies†). Reasons t o Initiate These Actions According to Randy Fields, the acquisition was enforced as an expansion tactic due to the fact that LPB dealt with both cookies and various other bakery products to the upscale customers through sit-down cafes. However, as stated by the founders the strategy represented something extra than just expansion, which was treated to be new concept for Mrs. Fields’. It was due to this reason that the stores of Mrs. Fields’ after the acquisition went through a change process in order to obtain a new outlook of a combination store. This combination store thereby would serve both cookies and other bakery products along with ice-creams and deserts. Another reason to attempt the strategic decision of acquiring LPB was the belief of Randy. According to Randy’s perception, Mrs. Fields’ stores were running so vividly that any thing which adapted the brand name would perform well in the targeted market. Consequently, the then market analysis also depicted that the popularity of the quality baked products are somewhat resistant to the economic fluctuations. This in turn encouraged the founders to undertake the risk of acquisition and reformation. The in-depth cause of acquiring LPB was to incur a larger profit than Mrs. Fields’ could gain separately (Harvard Business

Pyschology Cast study assignment Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Pyschology Cast study assignment - Essay Example (Plante, 2005: 63). They believe in themselves, but their perception of their own self image is also affected by the feedback from others. In Steven’s case, his father’s constant criticism and ridicule in childhood, coupled with a lack of the father’s love, time, care and support may have threatened Steven’s image of himself as a strong person and a real â€Å"male†, thereby affecting his self esteem. In effect, his father’s behavior was tantamount to rejection of Steve, especially when he failed to sympathize with Steve when he was bullied, further eroding Steve’s self image as a male through a failure to identify with the only male he knew as a child. This has only been compounded by his mother’s attitude to him. Abnormal behavior may arise when the spectrum of basic needs that an individual has, such as air, water, food, love, belonging and self actualization, are not satisfied. (Simson and Strauss, 2003: 178). Steven’s mother was too affectionate to her son, so when she abruptly refused to let Steve into her bed, it appears likely that the boy would have perceived this also as a rejection. The causal act leading to the rejection was his masturbation, but he is unable to control this, thus placing him in a position where masturbation in the presence of a real woman appears wrong – leading to feelings of anxiety and guilt, with an impairment in his sexual function, as evidenced in his failure to perform with his girlfriend. Steven’s anger at his mother for ‘rejecting’ him is expressed in his anger against women, and the only time he is able to allow his sexuality to thrive without associat ed feelings of guilt, is when he sees celluloid women being hurt and violated because this makes him feel powerful. The feelings of depression Steven has been suffering from can thus be attributed to the conflict between his self worth and the reality of his parents’ ‘rejection’, which has produced feelings of anxiety and

Documenting the Media Revolution Research Paper - 1

Documenting the Media Revolution - Research Paper Example However, the advent of the computer era and the development of various electronic based gadgets have allowed man to finally come up with an alternative to print media. I speak of the eBook readers that come bundled with most of our smartphones and tablet PC's. This paper will take a look into the history of the eBook, what gadgets existed prior to the advent of the modern day eBook reader, and how the technology has made reading a more interactive activity these days. eBooks first appeared on the market back in 1998. The precursor of today's readers were the Softbook and Gemstar Rocket eBook Reader. These particular readers did not easily catch on at the time since most people were still adapting to the internet and paperless era so very little attention if any were actually paid to the launch of these readers. However, the year 2000 launch of Stephen King's horror novel Ride the bullet in pure eBook format called attention to the up and coming technology. By 2003, eBooks and readers were still trying to break into the market as paper books still remain the traditional favorite. by July, Gemstar is merely a footnote in the history of the readers while Barnes and Noble pulls out eBooks from their stores. Critics then begin to predict the beginning of the end for the digital reader format. But the technology gains a new life with the advent of the Sony Librie which is a marked improvement upon its predecessors since it now uses electronic ink and has managed to reduce the backlight glare thus allowing the reader to show the same type of actual ink quality for the reader. By 2007, the Kindle is released and everyone now knows that the eBook reader is here to stay. From that point on other ebook reader devices such as the Nook come into market play. (Kozlowski, Michael â€Å"A Brief History of eBooks†). Even print book manufacturers cannot help but acknowledge that the eBook is fast edging out its physical format competitor in terms of book sales. According to research done by the Pew Research Center: The population of e-book readers is growing. In the past year, the number of those who read e-books increased from 16% of all Americans ages 16 and older to 23%. At the same time, the number of those who read printed books in the previous 12 months fell from 72% of the population ages 16 and older to 67%. (Rainie, Lee & Duggan Maeve â€Å"E-Book Reading Jumps; Print Book Reading Declines†) If one were to think about it, the rise of the eBook reader was actually something that was going to happen eventually. Our society is fast becoming a very tech savvy, gadget obsessed group that is constantly on the look out for the next big gadget that can make their lives easier. In this case, the eBook reader came across at just the right time. People were already conditioned to reading newspapers and other material via the internet and through their computer screens that using the eBook reader was not something that people feared anymore. The technology also found itself vastly improved thanks to the constantly evolving structure of the laptops as well. Newspapers and book publishers acknowledged the fact that there was more money for them to make through the electronic publication of their newspapers and books, so it is easy to surmise that the publishing sector also had a direct hand in the decision of their subscribers to switch to the eBook version of their reading material. (Fowler, Geoffrey & Baca, Marie â€Å"The ABC's of E-Reading). One reason that people are

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually

Essay example --

I do always believe in the fact that the more knowledge you gain, the more professional you become. This made me an obvious choice to pursue graduate studies to meet the pinnacle of professional excellence. Presently I am pursuing my final semester of undergraduate study in Computer Science and Engineering I feel it is the right time to take a decision regarding my Masters that contributes for better molding of my future career in the field. The philosophy which I strongly believe in my life is â€Å"A person may not put in his complete efforts in doing a work that he is intended to do but, he will surely give his 100% if the work he does is of his interest†. In my entire journey from my schooling to undergraduate study, I was always fascinated by the tremendous advancements in technology that made many troublesome tasks convenient to the mankind. The computer technology has ushered in a revolution that is unprecedented in its sweep. Its effect on the everyday lives of ordinary people has been phenomenal. Right from the super satellite control stations to the grocer’s humble shop, the efficient office and the busy kitchen in the home this technology is all pervasive, all consuming. This is what makes it one of the most challenging fields as it not only meets needs but has the power to create new needs, rules and total environments of its own. In this pursuit of doing masters in my areas of interest, I was happy to go through coursework for Computer Science and am really interested to do my MS in CS at your esteemed university. I prefer a reputed university in US for its gamut of opportunities and good scope for research in my field of interest. It’s a great privilege t... ... punctuality for which I am physically and mentally equipped. The main aim in opting for an American standard of education is very high competence Particularly in the field of Computer Science. Being a hard working and committed student, I am certain that I will be able to cope with the rigors of an International curriculum with ease. My determination to succeed and do well will enable me to be among the better students of your college. I sincerely request you to consider my application for admission into your reputed university. I would be grateful to you if I am accorded the opportunity to pursue my higher studies and given the opportunity, I am sure that I will be able to achieve my goals keeping in touch with the expectations of the university. Looking forward to be a part of your Master’s Degree Program. Thanks for your time

American Imperialism

During the Cold War, the world in general was a maniacal, paranoia-driven place to live in. Feelings of nationalism and inter-cultural isolation/conformity created rifts filled with fear between opposing nations, especially the two superpowers. The United States, as the juxtaposition to Soviet communists, sought to identify communism as a social evil, and a suppressor of both happiness and liberty.The resulting mentality following the period of global animosity triggered numerous instances of economic/cultural collapse, simply because the United States refused to acknowledge communism as an acceptable alternative to a democratic, capitalist society. In truth, the actions practiced by the United States are essentially reprehensible. Just to eliminate traces of the misconception that capitalism is the solution to world-suffering, one must recall the situation in Chile during the Cold War.When Augusto Pinochet came to power in 1973, a startling statistic is that the unemployment rate wa s an enviable, by today’s standards, 4. 3%. However, in 1983, after ten years of free-market modernization, unemployment reached 22%. Real wages declined by 40% under military rule. This reality solidifies the fact that although not a necessarily democratic government, the free-market/capitalist Chilean government, severely exacerbated the issue of poverty in Chile.Capitalism, a system consistent with democracy, failed. Miserably. The first point is that the United States’ concerns for the economic well-being of other countries was misplaced, believing that the only way is the American way. As a world power drunk with international influence, the United States forced its policies on nations that were doing well without being â€Å"saved†.

Still Hungry in America Essay Example

Still Hungry in America Essay Example Still Hungry in America Paper Still Hungry in America Paper Still Hungry in America Marian Edelman Wright wrote the famous literacy narrative Still Hungry in America. Marian Wright has been a proponent for disadvantaged Americans her entire life. Edelmans career began after graduating from Spellman College and Yale Law School. After graduation, she became the founding president of the Childrens Defense Fund (CDF). In result of Edelmans phenomenal leadership, CDF has become the nations strongest voice for less-fortunate families and children. The mission of CDF is to leave no child behind. This mission was imposed to ensure that every child has a healthy start, a head start, a fair start, a safe start, and a moral start in life and a successful passage to adulthood. In addition, in the many professional positions Edelman held, her primary purpose was to stand up for the ones who lived in poverty and for the ones starving from food shortage. By writing Still Hungry in America, she intended to communicate this purpose so others would Join the cause and help prevent family and children starvation. Her objective in this particular writing is to how how important government assistance programs are too many Americans. She made it very clear in her writing, that although America is the richest nation in the world, many Americans still suffer from or is on the verge of starvation. She also made it very clear that it is important to fght for these programs whenever necessary because although these programs have proven to be helpful to the American people, there are some people out there who fill they are a waste of government spending. It is easy to draw this conclusion because Edelman had to fght back at several groups n the past who tried to defund state and government programs. She also attempted to persuade readers to see her point-of-view by elaborated on the struggles she encountered and overcame in the past. In addition, she had to fght for more programs that would help less-fortunate American on a large-scale level. In result, she help fght for the implementation and expansion of government programs such as food stamps. Moreover, Edelman uses specific quotes to build her argument such as Im not hungry, dont worry about it. These quotes add to her writing significantly. In result of using this quote, it is very clear that her writing is now a combination of ethos, logos, and pathos. This is true because ethos means convincing by the character of the author, pathos means persuading by appealing to the readers emotion, and logos means by the use of reasoning. All three of these terms are clearly seen in this particular writing. Personally, I believe this writing relies more on logos than any other term. I believe this because she is mainly persuading by reasoning. By diamannichols

One Flew Over The Cuckoos Nest and Biblical Relevance essays

One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest and Biblical Relevance essays The conflict between good and bad has been going on for as long as mankind has existed. Satan, in the Bible uses betrayal and temptation to obtain power. You see the same clash of power between good and bad in Ken Kesey's, "One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest". A book infused with what may be unintentional religious imagery and allusions to the Bible and Jesus Christ. A noticeable allusion in the story is that McMurphy is portrayed as a Christ figure. When McMurphy arrives at the psych ward you can tell that he is much different than all the other patients. As the Chronics and Acutes are kept from the outside world living dull lives shackled by the ward's wall, McMurphy has more energy and life than all of them combined. The patients start to take notice of McMurphy vibe of liveliness and that he care about them like no has ever done before. McMurphy's entrance to the mental institution is much relatible to Christ's birth. Christ was a man who was greatly different then anyone else. His mission was to enlighten people through his teachings. In the Cuckoos Nest, the patients notice McMurphy's difference in individuality and are anxious to discover their own. By living his own life McMurphy sets an example of freedom; Christ sets an example of selflessness and freedom by living his life. As you read throughout the book, the resemblance of Christ and McMurphy becomes more clear. McMurphy gets together a fishing trip for the patients, McMurphy takes the "twelve of us [patients] towards the ocean," (Kelsey 203) just like the fishing trip Christ took his disciples on. He shows that his followers are able to care of themselves and accomplish obstacles. The guys on McMurphy's boat soon realize that they are men, and not the rabbits they thought they once were. Like Christ's disciples realizing the real message of the kingdom of heave, is within you. Christ makes it clear that he does not need to be there for the men to survive and do good ...

Analyze (in the land of the free) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Analyze (in the land of the free) - Essay Example Customs officers tell them that their son cannot be allowed to go ashore. Due to the bureaucratic reason, Lae Choo and Hom Hing leave their sons with immigration authorities expecting to return the next day to pick him up. They are confident that the immigration authorities will give them back their child. However, after five months, their child has not been given back to them. Instead, the immigration authorities left the young boy at the hands of missionaries. Hom Hing hires a lawyer, James Clancy to appeal to the immigration authorities to release the boy. When he failed, the lawyer asks Hom Hing for five hundred U.S dollars to appeal to the government directly in Washington D.C. Lae Choo proffers her jewelry, as Hom Hing does not have enough money. She gives the lawyer, her hairpins, gold buttons, rings, and comp of pearl with the expectation that they were enough for acquisition of papers for her son’s release. Five more months passed before Clancy succeeds. When she regains her son, Lae Choo goes directly to the missionaries to bring him home. However, due to long time between them, a small boy runs back to the missionaries and tells her mother to go away (Sui, Ling & White, 1995). Lae Choo is one of the main characters. She is the wife of Hom Hing. The immigration authorities take away her two years old son and place him under the care of missionaries. Lae Choo is a good wife. While in China, where she went to give birth to her son, she takes care of her husband’s sick parents for two years even though she had gone there to give birth. In addition, Lae Choo is a loving and a caring mother. When the immigration authorities took her baby, she could not sleep that night. When asked to sleep by her husband, she responded, â€Å"Ah, how could I sleep with my hands empty of the young boy?† (p. 53). She also shows her loving and caring nature when she decided to give James Clancy her jewelries as her husband

Finance Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Finance - Research Paper Example 1. Distribution analysis American Eagle Outfitters (AEO) has got outlets in USA as well as in Canada. All total there are more than 900 stores in and around USA and Canada. There are more than 150 stand alone stores in USA. The compnay has presence in more than 76 different international countries. AEO produces its own products and also sells them under the same brand name. Although the products itself may have different brand name but it comes from the same fashion house. The supply chain of AEO is a two level process only. Thus, the number of intermeidaries are comparatively low. The raw matrials are sourced from 15 different suppliers and the 5 different manufacturers produce the final products. The products are shipped to the warehouses (Bethel 24). They remain in the warehouse till new order for delivery are received. The products are then shifted to the distribution centre and from the distribution centre to the airports and ports. Most of the time the products are shifted thro ugh the ports. This is because of the reason that the waterway offers the most efficient and cost effective way to transport the goods. Once the goods reach the ports, then the goods are trasported from the ports to the distribution centre (Alchain 780). The manufacturing centres are present in Pittsburgh, in USA. The goods are sent using both railway and roadway. The outlets are spread all across the States. As mentioned there are about 150 stand alone shops. The stand alone shops deal with American Eagle Outfitters products only (Betty 602). These outlets have large holding capacity of apparel products. So the products are stored on season basis. The small shops or the multi brand shops are supplied with products on a monthly basis. The stand alone shops sometime also act distribution centres for the smaller outlets or the multi brand shops. Fig 1: Distribution system Source: (Betty 607) The following diagram gives a schematic view of the supply and distribution system of AEO. The orders are processed and then sorted in order of the importance and delivery date. Then the inventory is assesed to find out how much additional orders need to be put with the manufacturers to suffice the demands (Modigliani 262). The products are then packed and kept ready to be shifted to the distribution centres in case of inland distribution (Boyd 20). If overseas distribution is involved then the products get shifted directly from the warehouses to the airports and the ports, for airlifting and transportation through waterways. Fig 2: Value chain Source: (Boyd 24) 2. Market analysis USA has one of the largest apparel market in the world. USA alone constitutes 28% of the total global market. The market value of the USA apparel is USD 331 B. The apparel industry employes about 105, 457 people on an average basis. Although the percentage share of people employed by the USA apparel market is quite small in comparison to the rest of the world (Boyd 30). This is because of the reaso n that the the percentage share denoted by USA in terms of employment size is significantly small in comparison to the huge percentage share (28%) in terms of market value. The market share is analysed by denoting the total value of all the apparels sold in each quarter as well as by